Discussions of civil society in international contexts usually focus, naturally enough, on global civil society. As an American writing about civil society and nuclear disarmament, however, and as lack of disarmament progress by the United States is a central obstacle to nuclear disarmament, despite recent rounds of pro-disarmament rhetoric coming from US political elites, I believe that it is more appropriate to focus mainly on US civil society, and on the implications for civil society of the European and American disarmament movements that once captured its attention. To the casual US observer, the world of arms control and disarmament presents a confusing prospect. We hear positive rhetoric about disarmament from prominent statesmen and even from leaders of nuclear-weapon states, and yet the elimination of nuclear arsenals seems as far off as ever. President Obama epitomized this contradiction in his oft-invoked Prague declaration that nuclear disarmament must be achieved—but likely this will not be in his lifetime.

The first concrete manifestation of this supposed new commitment to disarmament by the leading nuclear-weapon states is a renewed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). That treaty, however, would accomplish only small reductions over many years, leaving civilization-destroying arsenals in place for the foreseeable future. In the United States, the treaty must be ransomed from the military–industrial complex by commitments to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on measures designed to assure that disarmament will remain a distant dream: the maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons systems and the laboratories and factories where they are designed and built.

Finally, in a world beset by overlapping economic, ecological and resource crises that could give rise to conflict among great powers for reasons both novel and familiar, those claiming to be most expert about armaments seldom mention the possibility of wars between the most powerful nuclear-armed states. Instead, public discussion of non-proliferation and disarmament is dominated by the purported nuclear dangers posed by small states and even by small armed bands that have no nuclear weapons at all.

Twenty-five years ago there were vigorous and diverse disarmament movements in the United States and elsewhere. In the United States today, those movements are largely gone. What remains is the “arms control and disarmament community”, an insular subculture of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that focuses most of its resources on policy debates and proposals in national capitals and international negotiating forums. These groups mainly

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deploy the standard repertory of interest group political pressure techniques, with expert policy analysis and top-down publicity and public opinion mobilization used to muster support for proposals initiated by segments of governing elites that can be portrayed as moving toward disarmament.

The disappearance of the movements and the gradual transformation of most of the institutions left behind into professionalized single-issue pressure groups, I believe, are less the result of choices by the particular people and organizations than manifestations of deeper trends affecting not only disarmament work but other efforts for a more fair, democratic and ecologically sustainable way of life. These broader transformations have left us with less voice in the decisions that affect all of our lives than we had two or three decades ago. If we want to have an effect on something as central to the order of things as the ultimate weapons in a system underwritten by overwhelming violence, we must at the same time address the fragile state of what little democracy we have.

In 1985, E.P. Thompson, a leading voice in European Nuclear Disarmament (END) and one of the great social historians of his time, published a collection of his disarmament writings, *The Heavy Dancers*. Thompson did not choose to begin with a recitation of the terrible dangers posed by Cold War arsenals, or with the latest proposals for treaties or conventions or negotiating paths for their control. Instead, he opened with a meditation on two related themes: the working of cause and effect in making social change, and where new political ideas and the energies to realize them come from.

How do ideas and opinions change? How can opinions actually have an *effect*—upon politics, upon power?

The innovative area of culture—the area in which opinions change, new ideas and values arise—this is the most sensitive, most delicate, the most significant area of all our public life.

... I’m going to argue that this delicate innovative area of our culture is in some ways more manipulated—more marginalized—and more threatened than for a long time. New ideas still do arise, but they are either co-opted into a manipulated ‘consensus’ or they’re pushed out into a margin of public life, where people still march around with banners in their hands—but their hands will never be permitted to touch the levers of power.²

Thompson was not alone in asking these questions. Indeed, they were central to the everyday debates, structure and political project of many parts of the multifaceted upwelling of resistance to the nuclear-armed Cold War confrontation of which disarmament movements were a part. In the intervening years, these themes have been relegated not only to the margins of public life, but to the margins of discourse among those who advocate disarmament.
Thompson was talking about what generally is referred to as “civil society”, a concept for which many have offered definitions shaped to fit one or another purpose. Here I will refer to civil society as the realm of organizations, movements and ideas that exist outside the institutions of both the state and the private economy. A strong civil society allows “the creation of a genuinely self-governing, democratic society in which the state is the servant of society and economic power is democratically controlled as well.” A civil society that can play a useful role in sustaining and expanding anything more than the formal appearance of democracy must be “capable of preserving its autonomy and forms of solidarity in face of the modern economy as well as the state” [emphasis in the original].

Despite much lip service paid to the importance of “civil society”, few devote much attention to what is needed to sustain a civil society that can generate movements and institutions capable of doing more than lining up behind one or another wealthy or powerful faction. This is so despite the fact that civil society in many places is significantly weaker than when Thompson wrote at the height of the 1980s peace and disarmament movements.

The result has been a politics increasingly limited to debates among options predetermined by the entrenched government bureaucracies and the immense corporations that dominate the global economy. Both traditional institutions such as churches and communities linked to small-scale agriculture and the organizations that those without wealth and power have built for themselves as a counterweight to private capital and the state, such as labour unions or the alternative institutions built by such “new social movements” as the Cold War peace movements, disappear or are co-opted. The political system and then civil society have become hollowed out, reduced to a shell of procedure and appearance. In the void that remains, wealthy institutions create synthetic civil society institutions, from think tanks to faux grassroots organizations funded by industry associations and billionaires, while foundations (also conduits for concentrated wealth) provide incentives to channel what dissent remains into activities that leave the distribution of wealth and power untouched, and largely unquestioned.

The predominant response in disarmament circles, however, has not been renewed reflection on the requirements of a healthy civil society and the role that social movements might play. Instead, many people and organizations seem to see these developments as inevitable, adapting to rather than struggling against an increasingly impoverished civil society and public sphere. Disarmament discourse and organizational practices largely recapitulate other forms of single-issue interest group politics. Arms control and disarmament efforts focus on promoting treaties and other arms control measures in international forums, on campaigns for modest cuts in armament budgets, and on assembling expressions of support for these campaigns. Professionals working in NGOs deploy expert argument and conventional bargaining and lobbying techniques in centres of power, while disseminating the latest in advertising and propaganda (e.g. “messaging”, “branding” and “framing”) via electronic and “social media” in an effort to mobilize a passive, atomized public opinion.
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Ritualized demonstrations and occasional, equally ritualized civil disobedience remain as vestigial markers of what once was a social movement, but they now largely have been reduced to image-generating publicity techniques at the same time that they have been restricted, normalized and assimilated by modern policing techniques. Large demonstrations also more often than not are organized from above, with cheap electronic communications and inexpensive long-distance transportation allowing the distillation of momentary crowds out of ever larger and more dispersed populations. Both demonstrations and civil disobedience largely have become removed from the solidarity-creating, skill-building, democracy-practising contexts in which they once were rooted, and which they helped to build and sustain. We may still march around with banners in our hands, but we are further than ever from the levers of power.

The prevalence in disarmament work today of conventional advocacy and campaigning techniques suggests a set of assumptions about how social change happens, and about how much social change is needed to make meaningful disarmament progress. These techniques are compatible with goals that have near-consensus social support and that can be achieved via technical adjustment by experts, or that while desired only by a segment of the population can be satisfied by bargaining and compromise among groups with conflicting, but acceptably reconcilable, interests. Devoting most attention and resources to expert advocacy and pressure group-style lobbying in centres of power implies a belief that significantly reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons does not require change of other well-entrenched social structures.

For the most part, advocacy for arms control and for the elimination of nuclear weapons proceeds as if the existence of nuclear weapons two decades after the Cold War is an aberration, and the abolition of nuclear weapons is a goal shared by ordinary people and most elites. Those who profit directly from the existence of nuclear arsenals are assumed to have some power, but ultimately it is assumed that nuclear weapons have little in the way of organizational constituencies in either the state or the economy beyond the nuclear weapons industries. It is taken as given that elites worldwide have come to see nuclear weapons as unusable, that interest in nuclear weapons technologies in the relevant science and technology communities is declining, and that there is little danger that states currently possessing nuclear arsenals will use them before they are eliminated.

Within this context, disarmament NGOs put considerable resources into monitoring international arms control negotiations, the forums where they are conducted and the occasional treaty that emerges from their endless rounds. Any new arms control treaty is treated more or less automatically as a good thing, and becomes the object of NGO expert advocacy, lobbying and campaigning. The concessions extracted by national nuclear weapons establishments as conditions for their agreement to additional “arms control” are treated as the inevitable outcome of interest-group bargaining, and the best that one can reasonably expect. More treaties and smaller numbers of weapons are equated to disarmament.
progress, even while nuclear arsenals are expected to exist in civilization-destroying numbers for decades to come.

At the time of writing, two campaigns dominate the messages flowing into my inbox from US arms control and disarmament groups. The first is a campaign to support the new United States–Russian Federation START. This is a treaty that will have only a modest impact on nuclear weapons deployments, and even that is to be phased in over a number of years.\(^8\) The Obama Administration has attempted to pre-empt opposition by proposing sustained increases in nuclear weapons spending for a decade. Having chosen surrender to the anticipated demands of its political adversaries as its opening gambit, the administration has been subjected to escalating demands for commitments not only for nuclear weapons and delivery systems but for missile defenses and a new class of highly accurate, powerful conventional “global strike” weapons with intercontinental range.\(^9\)

The appeals from arms control and disarmament groups to support START ratification come in two varieties. The most common approach asks that I tell my Senator to vote for START approval, without bothering to tell me about the bargain being offered to obtain it (apparently these organizations feel comfortable making the decision for me that the deal is acceptable). This approach constitutes the mustering of isolated, passive members of the public behind policies pre-chosen by those in power. The other tactic tells me to ask my Senator to support a START without conditions—without addressing the fact that Senate approval is virtually impossible under anything like current political circumstances absent the massive buy-off of the military–industrial complex that the conditions represent. This approach resembles a kind of branding designed to appeal to a particular segment of a peace demographic, while failing to make a commitment to any intelligible strategy for change.

Aside from a few voices on the margin, there has been little debate within the arms control and disarmament community about whether the exchange of significant political and financial commitments to the nuclear and strategic weapons wing of the military–industrial complex for an extremely modest arms control treaty adds up to disarmament progress. The absence of this debate is striking in light of the failure of a similar strategy for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the 1990s. Then, too, the most influential arms control and disarmament NGOs acceded to funding commitments to the nuclear weapons establishment in exchange for a treaty.\(^10\) We ended up a decade later with no CTBT, but with billions of dollars worth of new weapons facilities at the US nuclear weapons laboratories.

The second campaign, designed to raise awareness of nuclear weapons issues and supposedly to promote disarmament, centres on a film called *Countdown to Zero*. The campaign had considerable money behind it from foundations and others. The film, combined with media appearances by some of the experts who it features, emphasizes the dangers that either Iran or “terrorists”—entities that have no nuclear weapons—might acquire them. The possibility of an accidental nuclear exchange between nuclear powers also gets some attention, as does
the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan (like Iran, a country with a majority Muslim population). The possibility that such nuclear-armed states as China, France, India, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom or the United States might launch a war in which nuclear weapons might be used remains largely outside the frame. This approach essentially mirrors the official position of the US government, and arguably even helps to position it politically for further military action justified on “counterproliferation” grounds (as was the war in Iraq). The possibility that the campaign’s portrayal of states and Islamic “terrorists” that have no nuclear weapons as posing the greatest danger of nuclear catastrophe might be incorrect, or that this portrayal might amidst a general climate of anti-Muslim hysteria stoke support for foreign wars, militarism and even for nuclear weapons spending, apparently was not considered.

These campaigns, and the broader forms of social action they typify, reflect a weak civil society, the horizons of its political imagination limited to choosing among or reacting to the initiatives of the concentrated powers of the private economy and the state. These forms of campaigning and advocacy are not social movements, and are not the kinds of activities that build social movements. They are unlikely to be capable of accomplishing goals requiring substantial redistribution of wealth or political power. If meaningful disarmament progress requires that kind of change, the deeper and broader kind of political mobilization we think of as social movements will be necessary.

What do we need to do to eliminate nuclear weapons, and to prevent their use in the meantime? What is necessary to expand and sustain a democratic civil society? Many participants in the last wave of disarmament movements that reached their peak in the 1980s saw the latter as a precondition for the former, and also as the path to making change in other areas of social life that they thought important. The 1980s disarmament movements had significant strands that connected disarmament to other issues and placed all explicitly within a broader project of societal democratization. Adherents of this approach aimed to build a democratic and democratizing civil society out from under the frozen, authoritarian politics of both Cold War blocs. This entailed a vision that addressed the causes, as well as the symptoms, of nuclear-armed militarism:

Peace is more than the absence of war. A lasting peace can only be obtained by overcoming the various political, economic and social causes of aggression and violence in international relations as well as in the internal affairs of states. A comprehensive democratization of states and societies would create conditions favorable to this aim. Such democratization includes the existence of a critical public which has the capacity to exercise effective control over all aspects of military and security policy … The economic systems in East and West urgently need democratization. Social needs such as housing or work in safe and human conditions have to become more important in defining economic priorities.
In the West a primary task is to ensure that people are no longer marginalized by massive unemployment. In the East, decentralization of the economy is an essential task in order to make the economy more efficient and responsive to the needs of the people …12

The 1980s disarmament movements drew much of their power from the way such themes were brought together in local contexts, often crystallizing around campaigns of direct resistance to nuclear weapons development, manufacture and deployment. From the places where nuclear weapons were deployed to the laboratories and test sites where they were developed, strands of movements old and new entwined to dramatize and resist the nuclear arms race and the unaccountable economic and political powers it was understood to manifest. In the tents housing over a thousand people jailed after a protest at the US nuclear design laboratory in Livermore, California, for example, one could find people who first became engaged in politics in the labour movements of the 1930s, in various civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s, in the anti-war, environmental and feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, and others as well. Lessons from past movements were vigorously debated, old forms of self-organization and repertoires of action were retrieved and revised, and new ones invented, with seeds planted for relationships, organizations and later waves of movement organizing over the years and decades.13

Only a few years later the movements and nascent alternative organizations that had coalesced around Livermore brought together a broader coalition that included disarmament groups, organizations opposing US intervention in Central America, local chapters of environmental groups like the Audubon Society and the Sierra Club, and elements of organized labour in a successful campaign to resist the berthing of a flotilla of nuclear-armed US Navy ships in San Francisco Bay. The campaign linked disarmament, anti-intervention, jobs and development choices and environmental issues while sparking discussion of emerging new themes like the environmental impacts of the military and environmental justice. The participants developed new political ties, becoming part of the long interlocking chain of campaigns and movements that have built the network of organizations and relationships that make the San Francisco Bay Area one of the US regions where there is relatively more resistance to arms racing, militarism and war.

There were many views and a great deal of debate during those times about how one builds social movements, what social structures require change, and about the relationship to other issues or movements. The existence of this kind of discussion, and of diverse settings that make opportunities to experiment with and practise democracy widely accessible, arguably is essential to sustaining a healthy civil society. When a modern society largely lacks social movements, it loses more than mobilized and enthusiastic support for one or another issue. To a large degree the absence of visible social movements signals the absence of democracy itself.
In the parts of the world dominated by the modernist metropole—which also are the social and geographical locations that produce and sustain nuclear weapons—accomplishing significant structural change likely requires waves of social movements, constantly renewed. Democracy itself arguably requires such movements. We cannot all be mobilized all the time, but participation in social movements likely must always be in the living memory of many if we are to have anything more than a shell of democracy. Widely shared experience of first expanding the horizons of the political imagination, and then through hard work and shared risk forging the power and solidarity to work for a vision of a better world against determined opposition, instils the belief—both in the population as a whole and in those who seek unaccountable, undemocratic and unjustifiable power—that such movements can arise again. Ultimately, it is this potential for a mobilized, determined, self-conscious and self-organized population that is the only defence of “civil society” and democracy against the unlimited accretion of power to the large organizations of the modern economy and the modern state.14

“The Cold War stands upon two legs: a permanent war economy and a permanent enemy hypothesis. Of the two, it is the ideological leg which is the more brittle; and the one which the peace movement, as a movement of ideas and popular energies is best equipped to overthrow.”15

Thompson’s estimate proved correct, but peace movement strategies that may have contributed to the collapse of the Cold War confrontation proved inadequate to accomplish more nuclear disarmament than eliminating the baroque excesses of the Cold War arsenals. The “permanent enemy” ideology of the Cold War was indeed overthrown, and with it the particular kind of nuclear danger it helped to create was ended. This is also the extent to which strategies like the Freeze in the United States, which had only an ambiguous impact on the arms race itself, might be considered a success. The themes of strengthening civil society in the West that were significant elements in the 1980s disarmament movements were swept away by various triumphalisms, all of which provided rationales for treating the Cold War as a closed book. The idea of building a civil society capable of further democratizing the economy as well as the state was overwhelmed by a torrent of neoliberal ideology and top-down activism by the powerful. In the East, the organizations of Western capital combined with old bureaucratic elites to create new constellations of concentrated economic and state power that stunted the growth of a more democratic civil society. At the same time, the erosion of civil society and democracy was accelerating in the West.

These triumphalisms largely effaced critical reflection on how the Cold War had ended without catastrophe, and why. This was as true within the subcultures and discourses of nuclear weapons and disarmament as in society at large. Advocates of nuclear deterrence claimed that it had worked, and advocates of endless pursuit of military dominance argued that spending on overkill itself had played a significant role in bringing the Soviet system down. Disarmament
advocates asserted that while luck had played a part in saving the planet, their movements had played a significant role in restraining nuclear-armed elites.

The permanent war economy remained, and with it nuclear arsenals still large enough to destroy civilization several times over. The economic power and political inertia of the nuclear weapons establishments may have been sufficient to carry them through the ideological interregnum of the immediate post-Cold War period, stretching into the middle 1990s. By the turn of the new century, the inhabitants and beneficiaries of the various national security state apparatuses had created images of new permanent enemies.

Modernization of nuclear weapons continues, albeit at a slower pace. Innovations in other areas, however, from computing and remote sensing to space technologies and guidance systems, have brought the potential for complex new kinds of strategic confrontation and arms racing. Nuclear establishments may have been preserved only by some combination of inertia, relatively localized economic interest and anachronistic ideologies. They also may persist because they serve a broader array of elites with deeply rooted interests. If one is trying to formulate disarmament strategies this difference matters, but the requisite analysis remains largely unwritten. What is undeniable, however, is that large nuclear arsenals persist, and still could destroy human civilization in a day.

Various images of the Cold War and its arms races—as unchangeable as the Cold War itself once seemed—still dominate thought about the origins and purposes of large nuclear arsenals. The possibility that total war between the nuclear-armed adversaries would have been unlikely during the period of the Cold War in the absence of nuclear weapons receives little examination, as do the reasons that world-destroying arsenals persisted for years, and then for decades, after the end of the conflict that was their supposed raison d’être. Across the spectrum of expert arms control and disarmament opinion few seem to take seriously the possibility that there ever again can be war between most of the major powers that possess nuclear weapons. The exception to this is India and Pakistan, but their nuclear arsenals may be seen as posing distinct problems more because they are new than because they are different.

Yet we find ourselves today in a world that bears unsettling resemblances to that which brought the great power wars of the last century. Ascendant economic powers are challenging those that have been dominant for a century, competing with them for resources and for pre-eminence in profitable products and technologies. The magnitude and pace of development of these new powers is unprecedented, and is occurring in the context of equally unprecedented effects flowing from limits to key resources and to the carrying capacity of planetary ecosystems. These factors combine to generate extreme polarization of wealth and the widespread breakdown of traditional social structures. All of this is occurring within an economic framework dominated by immense capitalist firms that have gained sufficient power in much of the world to write their own rules, which in turn has brought back another feature of the time that brought us world wars: intractable economic crisis, with the actions
essential to break the impasse thwarted by the extreme accumulation of wealth and power by elites determined to keep things as they are.

When one looks at the countries that have nuclear weapons, there is ample cause for alarm. Most harbour the ingredients for near-term instability, and for the emergence of governments that could see increased militarism and an aggressive, risk-taking foreign policy as providing fixes for problems both foreign and domestic. For those who nonetheless take comfort in deterrence, it is worth recalling former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s observation that “We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear war today.”

It is time for the ordinary people of the planet to take away the power of the wealthy and powerful to play dice with our lives. “Instead of highlighting the horror of nuclear destruction, the ‘killing state’ should take center stage. The object of opposition is not the bomb but its owner: the state that endangers the lives of its citizens.” But the task of building a democratic civil society out from under all those who hold power that sustains and is sustained by a world of nuclear-armed states barely has been envisioned, much less begun.

Civil society at the international level poses a distinct set of problems, and hence can only be touched upon briefly here. It is evident that wealthier strata both within and among states are overrepresented in the civil society elements visible in national forums and debates. This is another reason that democratization of international civil society is inextricably intertwined with the democratization of civil society everywhere from the bottom up. Efforts to formulate a coherent vision of international civil society and of a concomitant global “public sphere” also encounter the disjuncture between the logic of civil societies and movements that mainly have developed to make demands on various forms of states, and an international disorder where rule structures are weak, concentrations of economic and political power even less constrained, and where military force remains the final arbiter of conflict. The problem of states as mutually reinforcing “protection rackets” is particularly salient in disarmament matters, with the existence of nuclear arsenals providing both a means and a rationale for the domination of the many by the few in a starkly two-tier world. In a time when most states are converging toward one or another version of oligarchic corporate capitalism, overcoming ideologies that justify the narrow interests of particular elites, including claims that nuclear arsenals and high-tech militarism serve one or another national general welfare, requires a viewpoint sharply counterposed to the top-down perspective of national security state discourses.

With the alliances of large, powerful organizations that support an unsustainable and inequitable status quo extending across borders as well as across the boundaries between state and economy, there is a need for discussion and action that extends across borders as well. These efforts, however, should be firmly grounded in the places where we experience the effects of decisions made at a great social and geographic distance, not in the halls outside the offices and meeting rooms of unresponsive decision makers. When we focus our efforts
prematurely at the apex of power, we are likely to fall prey to the way the powerful and their hired experts and professionals define the issues. There is little chance that disarmament NGOs acting in international forums can affect the core military policies of the most powerful states when civil society in those states is weak.

When our programme and priorities begin where we live, work and experience together the effects of decisions made in far-off centres of power, we are more likely to discover, and remember, the causes of risk and exploitation imposed on us without our consent. By staying closely connected to these roots, we can hope to create a positive spiral, making space for independent analysis and debate, identifying allies, creating places where people practise and learn the skills of democracy, and eventually building a civil society and a politics capable of building an economy and a state that work for us. In the long run, this is also the path to disarmament, and in the short run our best defence against authoritarianism, militarism and war.

Notes

10. See Jacqueline Cabasso, 2007, “Nuclear Weapons Research and Development”, in Michael Spies and John Burroughs (eds), Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security? US Weapons of Terror, the Global Proliferation Crisis, and Paths to Peace, New York, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Western States Legal Foundation and Reaching Critical Will, pp. 93 et seq.
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11. In the United States this has tended to be obscured by mainstream characterizations of the 1980s “anti-nuclear movement” that give disproportionate weight to the “Freeze”, a particular campaign that chose limited, single-issue tactics. Although a full examination of the Freeze is beyond the scope of this paper, a few observations are in order. The Freeze approach was not uncontroversial within the broader movement at the time, and attracted more support and attention within the movement in some regions than in others. It originated and was particularly prominent in the US North-east, a region whose concentration of media and political power generally has tended to allow its segments of social movements within a large, complex, diverse country to leave a disproportionate documentary trace.


13. Similar strands were woven differently in places like the long women’s encampment confronting nuclear cruise missile deployment at Greenham Common, United Kingdom, with symbolic roots as deep as centuries-old protests against enclosure and connections as recent as British environmental, feminist and urban squatters movements. See, for example, Sasha Roseneil, 2001, “The Global, the Local, and the Personal: The Dynamics of a Social Movement in Postmodernity”, in Pierre Hamel et al. (eds), Globalization and Social Movements, New York, Palgrave McMillan, p. 89.

14. For an expanded version of a similar argument see Cohen and Arato, op. cit., Chapter 10 and p. 562. For a related viewpoint in a different social setting, see Jayaprakash Narayan’s concept of non-violent movements with goals that require profound social change within the framework of a society that one seeks to democratize, at <www.mkgandhi.org/jnarayan/total_revolution.htm>, citing “Notes on Bihar Movement”, 1975, in Ajit Bhattacharjea, 2002, Transforming the Polity: Centenary Readings from Jayaprakash Narayan, Rupa and Co.

15. Thompson, op. cit., p. 353.


18. On this point see, for example, Nancy Fraser, 2005, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere”, at <www.republicart.net/disc/publicum/fraser01_en.pdf>.